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FAILED EXACTIONS 
Mark Fenster*† 
INTRODUCTION 
 This Article considers the doctrinal quandary created by “failed 
exactions”—regulatory conditions on property development that 
government agencies contemplate but that are never finalized or enforced. 
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission1 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,2 
the Supreme Court provided a quantitative and qualitative framework for 
judicial review under the Takings Clause of conditions that government 
agencies attach to approvals of a property owner’s application to intensify 
land use.3 Reaffirmed most recently in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,4 
Nollan and Dolan both blessed and limited these so-called land use 
“exactions.” The Court established two standards for lower courts to apply 
when deciding whether an individual condition takes private property 
without just compensation. Under Nollan and Dolan, agencies must 
demonstrate that a condition bears an “essential nexus”5 and has a “rough 
proportionality”6 to the impact the condition intends to address. 
Considerably more rigorous than the deferential review established in Penn 
Central7 for takings challenges to most regulatory acts, Nollan and Dolan’s 
intermediate scrutiny is considerably less rigorous than the strict scrutiny 
that courts apply to certain limited categories of regulatory acts.  
 The most significant legal question that failed exactions raise is 
whether Nollan and Dolan’s intermediate scrutiny applies to them. Given 
exactions’ prevalence in land use regulation,8 the issue’s resolution could 
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 1. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 2. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 3. Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Context 
of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 741–43 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a 
Constitutional Shadow]. 
 4. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
 5. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835. 
 6. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 7. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 8. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW § 9.9, at 345 (2d ed. 2007) (“An ever increasing number of local 
governments—even those without full scale growth management programs—have adopted policies and 
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have significant effects on court dockets and regulatory practice. 
Unfortunately, current law provides no clear path to resolution because 
Nollan and Dolan do not present a clear, comprehensive definition of an 
exaction. Two central questions have repeatedly divided courts and 
commentators about Nollan and Dolan’s reach: first, whether a monetary 
condition (typically referred to as an “impact fee”) is an exaction subject to 
Nollan and Dolan; and second, whether a broadly applicable, legislated 
condition (as opposed to an individualized one) receives intermediate 
scrutiny.9 The failed exaction issue has received much less attention.10 This 
is likely because in the vast majority of cases—including Nollan and 
Dolan11—the regulatory agency whose conditional approval faces 
intermediate scrutiny has completed its administrative process and attached 
an identifiable condition to an approved permit or other entitlement. This 
condition serves as the basis for local and state administrative review,12 
judicial review under Nollan and Dolan,13 as well as the determination of a 
compensation remedy under the Takings Clause.14 
 A decade ago, the issue of whether Nollan and Dolan applied to failed 
exactions reached the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari from the 
denial of which Justice Scalia dissented. Joined by Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas, Scalia somewhat tentatively stated that an extortionate demand 
could, and perhaps should, trigger review under Nollan and Dolan, even if 
the demand is not made part of an agency’s final approval of a regulatory 
entitlement.15 At the same time, he also conceded that it is “far from clear” 
whether conditions that are never attached to a permit can effect a taking of 
property under Nollan and Dolan.16 Both before and after Justice Scalia’s 
ruminations, courts have struggled with this question. As the recent Florida 
Supreme Court decision in St. Johns Water Management District v. Koontz 
                                                                                                             
programs designed to make new development and not existing residents bear the cost of new capital 
improvements . . . necessitated by the new development.”). 
 9. See generally Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow, supra note 3, at 
744–45 (summarizing issues); Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. 
L. 277, 287–89 (2011) (providing comprehensive literature and case law review). 
 10. I previously identified this unresolved issue in Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory 
Formulas: Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 639–42 (2004) [hereinafter 
Fenster, Takings Formalism]. An excellent recent discussion of the issue is Mulvaney, supra note 9. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part IV.D. 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. See infra Part IV.B. 
 15. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1047 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 16. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (Cal. App. 1997), review 
granted, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215 (Cal. 1998), appeal dismissed, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. 1999), cert. 
denied, 529 U.S. at 1047 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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reveals, judicial effort to put the unruly peg of an unenforced condition into 
the narrowly defined hole that Nollan and Dolan established creates an 
excess of confusion, perhaps beyond even that which Justice Scalia intuited 
would accompany such an inquiry.17 In reversing a lower court decision, the 
Florida Supreme Court clarified the law yet failed to provide a thorough or 
exceptionally clear explanation for its holding.18 Justice Scalia’s challenge 
thus still stands at the ready for other courts who might sympathize with 
vulnerable landowners being exploited by extortionate government 
agencies. 
 This Article identifies the doctrinal, remedial, procedural, and 
consequential dangers of any effort to apply Nollan and Dolan’s 
constitutional tests for failed exactions. When viewed in light of Lingle and 
the Fifth Amendment, Nollan and Dolan’s tests and remedy only make 
sense when a discernible, identified interest in property is in fact taken 
following the completion of an administrative process. The simple threat of 
possible extortion may warrant federal constitutional remedy and remedies 
from other sources of law, but it does not justify a remedy under the 
Takings Clause, in which the exclusive remedy is inappropriate and 
irrelevant to a failed exaction challenge. To extend Nollan and Dolan 
backwards in the regulatory process would stifle the reasonably functional, 
albeit imperfect and second-best universe of land use regulations and 
processes that have developed in a post-Euclid world.19 
 Because of the issue’s administrative and factual complexity, I begin in 
Part I with a stylized hypothetical example of when and how failed 
exactions arise, based loosely on the facts in Koontz. Part II briefly lays out 
the legal and administrative context for Nollan and Dolan, including an 
account of both decisions and the Court’s restatement of them more 
recently in Lingle. Part III summarizes the existing case law on failed 
exactions. Finally, Part IV argues why Nollan and Dolan cannot apply to 
non-finalized, failed exactions, and identifies other legal means to check 
extortionate threats by government agencies. 
 
                                                                                                             
 17. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz IV), No. SC09-713 (Fla. Nov. 3, 
2011), available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/2011/sc09-713.pdf. 
 18. Id. at 3.  
 19. By characterizing land use regulation as imperfect and second-best, I build on an insight 
that Neal Komesar developed more than three decades ago, in which he modeled various institutional 
approaches to handling land use externalities disputes and illustrated how two potentially perfect 
models—private behavior with a judicial backstop under nuisance law and an omniscient (and 
omnipotent) dictator—prove impossible to implement. See Neal K. Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the 
Public Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 219–23 
(Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978). 
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I. HOW AND WHEN EXACTIONS FAIL 
 To understand how exactions fail and what is at stake in the judicial 
review of their failure, consider the following hypothetical. 
 Having noticed increased development in the area surrounding the 
property that she owns in the City of Bishop, Audrey wants to improve her 
currently undeveloped land to make it viable for commercial use. To do so, 
she needs the approval of a panoply of agencies that regulate the effects that 
property owners’ development are likely to have on, among other things, 
the traffic, schools, floodplains, and animal habitat in the neighboring area 
and throughout Bishop. Bishop’s relevant regulatory agencies enjoy the 
authority, delegated by state constitution and statute as well as by municipal 
charter and ordinance, to deny property owners’ applications and require 
owners to mitigate the anticipated effects of their development as a 
condition of receiving necessary regulatory approvals. Such conditions 
might include fees, the dedication of property or the permanent restriction 
of its use, the building and contribution of infrastructure for the public use, 
or some combination thereof. These requirements, called “exactions,” may 
be calculated with relative precision based on one or more factors, such as: 
the proposed footprint; number and size of residential units; type of 
commercial development; the current conditions of the property and its 
surroundings; and the estimated impact that the use of the development and 
the structures themselves may have. However, both the mitigation measures 
and their effects are often difficult to calculate, and different measures 
might meet the same goals. As a result, agencies can be flexible in what 
they are willing to accept in exchange for a regulatory approval.  
 Let us assume that Audrey has retained some flexibility in her plans 
and that she is not entirely settled on precisely how much of her property 
she will improve and where on her property she will build. Let us assume, 
too, that one agency from which she must receive a permit, the Bishop 
Water Management District (BWMD), has concluded that a variety of 
mitigation measures would satisfy its concern about the effects Audrey’s 
development project might have on the surrounding floodplain and riparian 
habitat. In such a situation, it might behoove both Audrey and BWMD to 
discuss their individual positions: for Audrey, her willingness and ability to 
pay mitigation fees, dedicate land, or limit the size of her development; for 
BWMD, its concerns about the project and the regulatory options it is 
willing to accept. Such initial discussions might lead to an agreement that 
would result in one or more conditions of an acceptable type and quantity 
for both parties. Audrey would agree to a certain package of mitigation 
measures in exchange for a required approval—a result that might be 
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superior to a flat denial of her permit application.20 The agency might also 
prefer this negotiated agreement because it meets the agency’s regulatory 
goals while limiting or eliminating the risk and cost of litigation that might 
follow a permit denial or a unilaterally imposed condition. 
 Audrey’s story illustrates a number of characteristics of contemporary 
land use regulation. Because each regulated parcel has unique features, 
property owners make distinct, individualized development decisions, and 
agencies often prefer to enforce their regulations in an individualized 
manner. Numerous agencies, operating at different levels (federal, state, 
regional, and local) with authority over different aspects of a development, 
are typically granted broad regulatory authority over land development. 
These agencies seek to exercise their authority with the utmost discretion, 
and often do so with the vocal support of existing residents. This is 
especially true of the owners of affected neighboring property who are most 
likely to engage in the regulatory and local political process that can check 
and direct regulatory enforcement. Although she would undoubtedly prefer 
to face only an ex post threat of nuisance litigation as a limit to her property 
development, Audrey must contend with the existing regulatory and 
political environment that prevails in Bishop—one that, in this hypothetical, 
provides BWMD with the regulatory authority and political will to impose 
exactions on her development.  
 Nevertheless, she might attempt to challenge the exactions. Imagine 
two alternative scenarios in which this might occur. First, suppose that 
Audrey is so upset at the very idea of being forced to conduct and pay for 
the mitigation that the agency requires—mitigation that the agency 
considers in good faith but has not yet formalized—that she rejects the 
agency’s reasonable proposal. In response, the agency denies Audrey’s 
permit application. Alternatively, suppose that the agency engages in an 
unreasonable, extortionate effort that would require Audrey to spend 
significantly more money and deed or restrict the use of significantly more 
land than is required to mitigate her proposal’s effects. When she refuses, 
the agency denies her permit application. In either scenario, Audrey is 
likely to file suit.  
 What is the basis or grounds for her suit—that her permit application 
was denied or that she was being forced to accede to a condition to which 
she refused to agree? The way that a court poses that question—whether it 
reviews the claim as a constitutional challenge to a permit denial or an 
exaction—triggers different levels of judicial scrutiny under existing 
                                                                                                             
 20. Assume for this example that a denial would leave value in Audrey’s property—a likely 
result in most instances anyway—and that the BWMD would not be required to compensate Audrey 
under the Penn Central test. 
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Supreme Court tests in which the differences are likely to prove outcome-
determinative. 
II. EXACTIONS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CATEGORY 
 The vast academic literature on regulatory takings narrates, explains, 
and critiques the development of these differing standards of review for 
regulatory enforcement under the Takings Clause.21 This Part broadly 
outlines exactions’ place within the Supreme Court’s scheme and logic. As 
the Court comprehensively restated in Lingle, the regulatory takings 
doctrine channels analysis into a small set of limited categories of 
regulatory effects; the level of judicial scrutiny that courts must apply in an 
individual case follows from the category into which the effects fall.22 Two 
types of regulatory effects receive strict scrutiny and constitute “per se 
takings”23—those regulatory acts that deprive an owner of “all 
economically beneficial uses” of a fee interest in real property24 and those 
regulatory acts that impose a permanent physical occupation of property.25 
In both instances, the Takings Clause requires the state to compensate the 
owner for the value of the taken property. If, however, the regulatory effect 
falls outside these two “relatively narrow”26 categories, then the Court 
usually follows the “principal guidelines”27 and default approach for 
resolving regulatory takings claims established in Penn Central.28 The Penn 
Central balancing test defers to agencies by having courts balance “the 
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it 
interferes with legitimate property interests.”29 
 This schematic approach, the Supreme Court explained in Lingle, 
proceeds from a “common touchstone”: 
 
Each [category and inquiry] aims to identify regulatory actions 
that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which 
government directly appropriates private property or ousts the 
owner from his domain. Accordingly, each of these tests 
                                                                                                             
 21. See Mark Fenster, Takings, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property 
Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CON. L. 667 (2007) (reviewing some of the vast literature on regulatory takings). 
 22. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–39, 548 (2005). 
 23. Id. at 538. 
 24. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 25. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). 
 26. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538. 
 27. Id. at 539. 
 28. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978). 
 29. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. 
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focuses directly upon the severity of the burden that 
government imposes upon private property rights.30 
 
A complete diminution of all economically beneficial use places an 
absolute burden on an owner who can neither use nor alienate her 
property.31 A permanent physical invasion “eviscerates” the right to 
exclude, which is “perhaps the most fundamental of all property 
interests.”32 Finally, the Penn Central balancing test weighs the extent to 
which a regulation is so onerous as to approach confiscation.33 In sum, to 
effect a regulatory taking, the impact of a challenged regulation must 
approximate the experience of condemnation, where a property owner loses 
all rights to and control over her property. The precise nature of how the 
regulation approximates confiscation dictates the manner and level of 
scrutiny a court will apply. 
 The exactions decisions constitute a narrow, unique category that 
operates, both factually and doctrinally, as a distinct inquiry that lies 
between the per se takings categories and the default balancing test.34 By 
the 1980s, government agencies involved in urban and suburban planning 
regulation had grown increasingly dependent upon such conditions to 
supply needed infrastructure.35 The Supreme Court’s development of 
federal constitutional limits to these conditions was a reaction to the vast 
array of circumstances that developed on the ground in local land use 
regulations.36  
 Land use conditions require a level of constitutional scrutiny distinct 
from command-and-control regulation. This is because the government can 
impose a land use condition in certain circumstances that, if imposed in 
isolation, would amount to a taking.37 Such a taking would require no 
compensation if the exaction imposing the condition is qualitatively (via 
Nollan’s concern with “nexus”) and quantitatively (via Dolan’s concern 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 539. 
 31. Id. at 539–40. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 546 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–80 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987)). 
 35. See generally Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 10, at 622–26 (summarizing the 
development of conditional land use regulation). 
 36. See generally Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow, supra note 3, at 
758–68 (describing differentiation in the approach to exactions among state legislatures, courts, and 
local governments). 
 37. Id. at 746. 
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with “proportionality”) related to the anticipated consequences of the 
regulatory approval.38  
 The Court has consistently repeated that Nollan and Dolan, in which 
the inquiries into regulatory reasons and reasonableness smack of 
constitutional due process, have never been extended “beyond the special 
context of . . . exactions.”39 In Lingle, a unanimous Court emphasized this 
caveat about its exactions decisions, expelling from regulatory takings 
doctrine the suggestion made in Agins v. City of Tiburon that courts may 
consider whether a regulation will “substantially advance legitimate state 
interests” as part of a Penn Central balancing test.40 Regulatory “nexus” 
and “proportionality” at minimum echo a substantive due process-type 
reasonableness inquiry. 
 Therefore, broad application of Nollan and Dolan to regulatory takings 
claims threatens to confuse regulatory takings and due process. Only by 
requiring an actual taking as a factual predicate to the challenged exaction 
could the Court cabin Nollan and Dolan to preserve its effort in Lingle to 
clarify regulatory takings jurisprudence.41 If a Takings Clause challenge to a 
regulatory decision falls outside of the special context of exactions by 
lacking that factual predicate, a court must apply either strict scrutiny or the 
Penn Central balancing test.42  
III. EXISTING CASE LAW ON FAILED EXACTIONS 
 Do these exactions tests apply to failed exactions, and if so, how? A 
small number of courts have reviewed challenges to failed exactions 
brought under the Takings Clause. This Part considers four such examples, 
then concludes with a brief discussion of the range of responses to the issue 
and the difficulties that courts have encountered when applying Nollan and 
Dolan to failed exactions in an attempt to fashion a remedy for prevailing 
plaintiffs. 
                                                                                                             
 38. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–47 (explaining Nollan’s “essential nexus” requirement and Dolan’s 
“rough proportionality” requirement). 
 39. Id. at 547 (quoting City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 
702 (1999)). 
 40. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). See generally Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540–43. 
 41. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546–47. 
 42. Id. at 538. 
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A. Koontz v. St. Johns Water Management District 
 In Koontz, a property owner sought to develop part of a parcel located 
along a state road with commercial and residential property in its vicinity. 
To do so, Koontz needed to dredge and fill wetlands. However, because his 
property was located within a designated riparian habitat protection zone, 
he needed a permit from the St. Johns Water Management District.43 Staff 
members from the District offered alternative mitigation measures, while 
Koontz offered a third, less costly one. Ultimately, the parties could not 
agree upon any particular mitigation scheme.44 Numerous trial and appellate 
court decisions ensued. A first intermediate appellate decision overruled a 
trial court determination that Koontz’s claim was not ripe, because he had 
not received a final determination about the condition that would attach to 
an approved permit.45 On remand, the trial court applied Nollan and Dolan 
and found the District liable. This decision was affirmed by two 
intermediate appellate decisions: the first, in 2003, affirmed the trial court’s 
order overturning the permit denial on the grounds that it was an 
unreasonable exercise of the police power under Nollan, Dolan, and 
Agins;46 and the second, in 2009, affirmed the trial court’s decision to award 
Respondent compensation for a temporary taking of his land for the period 
in which the permit was denied.47  
 The 2009 district court of appeal decision (Koontz III), which the 
Florida Supreme Court reversed two years later, illustrates how courts 
struggle to classify failed exactions. There, a three-judge panel issued three 
separate opinions. The majority and concurrence rested their decisions to 
affirm the trial court’s application of Nollan and Dolan on their reading of 
precedent and on what they viewed as the District’s unfair and extortionate 
treatment of the property owner. Both the majority and concurrence agreed, 
incorrectly,48 that Dolan had extended the exactions decisions to instances 
in which no condition was attached to a permit approval.49 Furthermore, 
both cited several additional decisions from other jurisdictions that they 
                                                                                                             
 43. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 5 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011). 
 44. Id. at 5–6 (quoting St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz II), 861 So. 2d 
1267, 1269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring specially)). 
 45. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. (Koontz I), 720 So. 2d 560, 561–62 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 46. Koontz II, 861 So. 2d at 1268. 
 47. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz (Koontz III), 5 So. 3d 8, 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 48. See infra Part IV.A. 
 49. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 11; id. at 14 (Orfinger, J., concurring). 
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claimed had applied Nollan and Dolan to failed exactions.50 Although 
Judge Torpy’s decision mentions the bargaining power that the District 
leveraged to force the property owner to agree to an unconstitutional 
condition,51 Judge Orfinger’s concurrence more strongly presents the 
protection-against-extortionate-demands rationale for applying Nollan and 
Dolan in cases like Koontz III.52 He wrote: 
 
As the instant case demonstrates, when the government has the 
absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it still 
                                                                                                             
 50. See id. at 11–12 (citing Goss v. City of Little Rock (Goss I), 90 F.3d 306 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1983); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 
135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004); Salt Lake County v. Bd. of Educ., 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991)). Only one 
of the cited cases concerns a failed exaction. In Flower Mound, a property owner sought approval to 
construct a residential subdivision. 135 S.W.3d at 622. The Town approved the development permit with 
an attached condition that required the property owner to rebuild an abutting road. Id. After exhausting 
all available administrative remedies, the property owner acquiesced to the condition and rebuilt the 
road. Id. at 624. The Town refused to reimburse any portion of the road renovation cost. Id. The 
property owner sued, alleging that the condition placed on the Town’s regulatory approval amounted to 
a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Id. In 
Parks, property owners applied for a zoning change and the vacation of certain platted City streets 
across their property in order to increase land development. 716 F.2d at 649. The City required that a 
twenty-foot strip of property, containing ownership interests to two geothermal wells, be dedicated as a 
condition of the permit approval. Id. at 649–50. When property owners refused, the City voted to deny 
the vacation petition. Id. at 650. The Ninth Circuit held that the condition violated the Fifth Amendment 
since it required the dedication of the geothermal wells, which had “no rational relationship to any 
public purpose related to the vacation of the platted streets.” Id. at 653. However, Parks was decided 
before Nollan and Dolan and therefore could not have answered the question of whether those later 
decisions apply to a permit approval. In addition, Parks used terms and levels of scrutiny that the Court 
explicitly rejected in its later decisions and confused Due Process and Takings Clause analysis. Id. at 
652 (requiring the condition to be “rationally related to the benefit conferred”); id. at 651 (requiring the 
plaintiff to show that “the City’s condition . . . amount[s] to a taking of property without due process of 
law”). In Lingle, the Supreme Court forcefully rejected the approach taken in Parks that mixed the two 
constitutional doctrines indiscriminately. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) 
(declaring that a due process analysis “has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence”). The Florida 
Supreme Court had similarly and earlier warned against mixing the doctrines. See Tampa-Hillsborough 
Cnty. Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994) (“[T]he analysis under due 
process is different from the analysis under just compensation.”). Perhaps most egregiously, Salt Lake 
County, 808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991), was decided solely on state law grounds and did not mention either 
Nollan or the Fifth Amendment. The issue addressed in Salt Lake County concerned the existence of a 
Utah state statute that exempted school districts from paying “local assessments for any purpose.” 808 
P.2d at 1057. The County sought a declaratory judgment stating that the school district was not exempt 
from paying the drainage fee imposed by the county flood control ordinance. Id. at 1058. The school 
district claimed exemption under the statute alleging that the drainage fee was a type of “local 
assessment.” Id. The Supreme Court of Utah, without any mention of Nollan or the Fifth Amendment, 
held that the drainage fee was an impact fee and as such fell outside of the local assessment category. 
See id. at 1061. Goss in fact was a failed exactions decision and represents an exception that illustrates 
why it should be the rule that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to such regulatory acts. See infra Part III.B. 
 51. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 12 n.4 (characterizing the plaintiff as “an aggrieved property owner 
[forced] to accede to unconstitutional conditions to preserve his right to challenge the abusive practice”). 
 52. Id. at 14–15 (Orfinger, J., concurring). 
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may incur significant liability if, at the conclusion of the land 
use/development decision, it is found to have improperly 
pressured or coerced the landowner to give up or waive a 
constitutional right. And even more troubling, the potential for 
governmental liability may be just as likely if the government 
simply reaches a bit too far in the bargaining process. . . . The 
consequence of the government asking for a bit too much (but far 
short of extortion) is governmental liability for damages premised 
on the exactions theory.53 
 
The Koontz III majority was appalled by what they viewed as the District’s 
unreasonable pressure and coercion and held the District liable for a taking. 
The court awarded the plaintiff remedies that only awkwardly relate to the 
Fifth Amendment’s textual remedy of compensation for the taken property: 
It invalidated the District’s rejection of the property owner’s permit 
application and ordered compensation based on the temporary taking of the 
property owner’s land for the period in which the permit was denied.54  
 The Florida Supreme Court reversed the district court of appeal 
unanimously in two separate, quite different opinions (Koontz IV). The 
four-justice majority focused not on the reasonableness of the District’s 
actions, but on the limited reach of Nollan and Dolan to exactions.55 The 
Koontz IV majority held that Nollan and Dolan apply only to exactions 
conditioning permit approval upon a dedication of a landowner’s interest in 
real property when the regulatory agency actually issued the permit 
containing such an exaction.56 The majority asserted that this limited 
reading has two advantages over an approach that would have held the 
District liable. First, land use regulation would become “prohibitively 
expensive” if a property owner were allowed to file suit any time 
unsuccessful negotiations with the regulatory agency led to a permit 
denial.57 Second, regulatory agencies would respond to the risk of large 
takings judgments by denying permits outright in order to shield themselves 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 14. 
 54. Id. at 10–11 (majority opinion); Koontz II, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
 55. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 18 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011). (“[W]e are guided only by 
decisions in which the Supreme Court has expressly applied, or commented upon the scope of, exactions 
takings.”). 
 56. Id. at 19. The court therefore overruled the lower court on the grounds both that Nollan and 
Dolan do not apply to failed exactions and only apply to conditions requiring the dedication of land. The 
latter grounds, the court does not explain in any detail. See id. at 9 (citing Iowa Assurance Corp. v. City 
of Indianola, 650 F.3d 1094, 1096–97 (8th Cir. 2011); W. Linn Corporate Park, LLC v. City of W. Linn, 
428 F. App’x 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2011)) (justifying its decision based on recent decisions in two federal 
circuits). 
 57. Id. at 20. 
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from the hazard of liability that could result from negotiating and discussing 
potential alternatives with landowners seeking permit approval.58 
 The two-justice concurrence did not reach the regulatory takings 
issues.59 Instead, it asserted that the property owner was required to exhaust 
all administrative remedies referenced in the applicable Florida statute 
before initiating the present regulatory takings action.60 Refusing to reach 
the constitutional issues that the majority decided, the concurrence believed 
that the claim was unripe and thus not justiciable. Consequently, all of the 
justices agreed that the property owner could not seek his preferred remedy 
for failed negotiations from a court. 
B. Goss v. City of Little Rock 
 The Eighth Circuit in Goss v. City of Little Rock struggled to apply 
Nollan and Dolan to failed exactions.61 In Goss, a property owner 
challenged the City of Little Rock’s denial of a rezoning application as a 
regulatory taking after the owner refused to dedicate 22% of his 3.7 acre 
parcel of land for a highway extension, which the City had sought as a 
condition for approval.62 Apparently viewing the petition as a challenge to 
the City’s denial of a zoning application, the district court had initially 
dismissed the suit.63 In the first appeal, the Eighth Circuit, with little 
explanation or reasoning, construed the complaint as stating a claim under 
Nollan and Dolan and remanded the case to the trial court for further 
consideration.64 Reviewing the permit denial as a failed exaction to which 
the Supreme Court’s exactions decisions applied, the district court held on 
remand that the dedication requirement effected a taking and ordered the 
City to rezone the property owner’s land as commercial without attaching 
any such condition.65 It found, however, that the property owner was not 
entitled to receive compensatory damages, punitive damages, or attorney’s 
fees.66 
 Considering the case on appeal for a second time, the Eighth Circuit 
refused to reconsider the City’s claim that the trial court should not have 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. 
 59. The exact lineup in Koontz IV was four votes in the majority, two with the concurrence, 
and one concurrence by a justice who did not join either opinion. 
 60. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 22 (Polston, J., concurring) (citing FLA. STAT. 
§ 373.617(2) (2002) (requiring initial administrative review of final agency action)). 
 61. See Goss v. City of Little Rock (Goss II), 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 62. Id. at 862. 
 63. Goss I, 90 F.3d 306, 307 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 64. Id. at 308–10. 
 65. Goss II, 151 F.3d at 862. 
 66. Id. 
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applied Nollan and Dolan—after all, the earlier appellate panel had ordered 
the trial court to apply the tests from those cases.67 Instead, the panel in 
Goss II quickly affirmed the district court’s determination that a taking had 
occurred, holding that the condition was not roughly proportionate to the 
impact of the proposed zoning change.68  
 But faced with the problem of fashioning a remedy for the taking, the 
court reversed course. It overruled the district court’s order to rezone the 
property without the attached condition, concluding that the City had “a 
legitimate interest” in denying the rezoning application “outright.”69 
Therefore, the court held that the property owner was not entitled to 
compensation. “Little Rock was not legally required to rezone Goss’s 
property,” the court reasoned, and therefore could not be forced to pay the 
property owner compensation when the City was merely exercising its 
legitimate authority.70 Despite disallowing a remedy, the court nevertheless 
awarded the property owner attorney’s fees.71 
 Goss II thus confronted the issue that the lower appellate court in 
Koontz simply ignored when it applied Nollan and Dolan to a failed 
exaction: how to award the Takings Clause’s remedy in a failed exaction 
case. Although it ultimately concluded that the City’s condition constituted 
a taking, the court was forced to concede that no remedy was available 
under the Fifth Amendment because no dedication actually occurred. The 
property owner suffered no damages that were cognizable under the Fifth 
Amendment. Thus, while a failed exaction apparently infringed upon a 
right, the Fifth Amendment provided no remedy. The owner could gain 
little more than “a purely Pyrrhic victory.”72 
C. William J. Jones Insurance Trust v. City of Fort Smith 
 Like in Goss, the U.S. district court in Jones Insurance Trust found that 
a failed exaction effected a taking.73 The facts were quite simple: The 
property owner applied to the City of Fort Smith for permission to build a 
convenience store on the premises of a gasoline station that it already 
operated. City officials required the property owner to grant the City an 
expanded right-of-way along the relevant property to widen the adjoining 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. at 863 (holding that “the [City’s] argument that Dolan does not apply is foreclosed by 
our contrary decision in the previous appeal”). 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 864 (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835–36 (1987)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. William J. Jones Ins. Trust v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990). 
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street. In response, the property owner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to 
enjoin the City from withholding permission until the property owner 
granted the condition.74  
 Displaying broad sympathy for the property owner—in no small part 
by including a wholly gratuitous footnote pointing readers to Richard 
Epstein’s “brilliantly sustained and intellectually unrelenting elaboration of 
the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and taxes” in his book 
Takings75—Judge Morris Arnold found that the condition, standing alone, 
constituted a taking.76 Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Goss II, however, Judge 
Arnold incautiously offered the owner its requested remedy: an injunction 
“ordering the City to issue the requested permit unconditionally.”77 
D. Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco 
 In Lambert v. City & County of San Francisco, proprietors of a San 
Francisco hotel containing both residential and tourist units sought to 
convert the remaining residential units into tourist accommodations. The 
property owners applied to the San Francisco Planning Commission for a 
conditional use permit.78 Pursuant to local ordinance, such a permit was 
prohibited unless the property owner provided one-to-one replacement of 
the units or agreed to pay a portion of the replacement costs.79 The City and 
property owners disagreed over the replacement costs for the unit 
conversion, and the fee the City required was beyond what the property 
owner was willing to pay.80 When the property owners offered a figure 
significantly below the appraised cost, the City denied the permit.81  
 A two-judge majority of a California intermediate appellate court 
rejected the property owners’ argument that their claim warranted review 
under the intermediate scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan. The majority reasoned 
that because the Planning Commission rejected the owners’ conversion 
application under authority granted by San Francisco’s Planning Code 
rather than by attaching a monetary condition which the owners later 
rejected, the proper review was of the rejection itself, not the rejected 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. at 913. 
 75. Id. at 914 n.2. 
 76. Id. at 914. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 569; see also id. at 569–71 (Strankman, J., dissenting) (discussing negotiations and 
disagreements over a mitigation fee in detail). 
 81. Id. at 569. 
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condition.82 One member of the three-judge panel dissented, arguing that 
the Planning Commission sought to leverage its regulatory bargaining 
power with an extortionate demand for a monetary exaction.83 The dissent 
stated that the Planning Commission should not be able to evade judicial 
scrutiny by hiding behind its authority to deny the owner a permit if she 
refuses to agree.84 In his dissent from the denial of the property owners’ 
petition for certiorari, Justice Scalia agreed with the Lambert dissent, 
dismissing the notion that a condition subsequent—a completed exaction 
attached to an approval—should be subject to a wholly different, stricter 
level of scrutiny than a condition precedent, to which a property owner 
must agree or else face denial.85 Justice Scalia suggested an alternative 
approach: 
 
When there is uncontested evidence of a demand for money or 
other property—and still assuming that denial of a permit 
because of failure to meet such a demand constitutes a taking—it 
should be up to the permitting authority to establish either (1) 
that the demand met the requirements of Nollan and Dolan, or (2) 
that denial would have ensued even if the demand had been 
met.86 
 
As Justice Scalia conceded, however, whether or precisely how the 
exactions decisions applied in Lambert—or, by extension, other similar 
cases—was “far from clear.”87 Moreover, he noted, it was unclear how and 
whether compensation could be due when “there is neither a taking nor a 
threatened taking.”88 
E. Conclusion 
 As demonstrated above, the case law on failed exactions is somewhat 
confused and scattered. Courts are occasionally willing to apply 
intermediate scrutiny to instances in which the government acted in an 
extortionate manner akin to that in Nollan and Dolan, but they face 
significant conceptual and remedial obstacles when they do. However, 
some courts blithely ignore such obstacles, as Judge Arnold did in Jones 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. at 569 (majority opinion). 
 83. Id. at 572 (Strankman, J., dissenting).  
 84. Id. at 572–73. 
 85. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 86. Id. at 1047–48. 
 87. Id. at 1048. 
 88. Id. 
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Insurance Trust. When no property is taken, how does the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause, which speaks of “private property . . . taken 
for public use,”89 apply? If Nollan and Dolan do apply, what is the 
condition subject to their nexus and proportionality tests? And if the 
property owner wins, how does the Fifth Amendment, which explicitly 
provides only one remedy, “just compensation,”90 provide a suitable 
remedy for a condition that was never exacted and for a rejected 
development application that the government was authorized to reject? Part 
IV considers these questions broadly in light of the text of the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that text, and broader questions of 
administrative procedure and land use regulatory practices. 
IV. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE TO FAILED EXACTIONS 
A. Nollan and Dolan Concerned Finalized Exactions 
 What are the regulatory effects that fall within the constitutionally 
meaningful category of “exactions”? At a minimum, and perhaps at a 
maximum,91 a catalog of the category’s universe of regulatory acts must 
begin with Nollan and Dolan. As the Court characterized them in Lingle, 
Nollan and Dolan concerned “Fifth Amendment takings challenges to 
adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government demands that a 
landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her property as a 
condition of obtaining a development permit.”92 In Dolan, the property 
owner challenged requirements that she grant public easements for a 
floodplain and bike path as conditions attached to her approved permit 
application by the City of Tigard’s Planning Commission.93 In Nollan, the 
                                                                                                             
 89. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 18 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011). (“[W]e are guided only by 
decisions in which the Supreme Court has expressly applied, or commented upon the scope of, exactions 
takings.”). 
 92. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005). 
 93. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379–80 (1994). The majority and concurrence in 
Koontz III asserted that Dolan was in fact a failed exactions case—indeed, both appear to indicate that 
their decisions turn on this point. See Koontz III, 5 So. 3d 8, 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (declaring that 
the question of Nollan and Dolan’s applicability to failed exactions “has already been answered in 
Dolan itself”); id. at 13–14 (Orfinger, J., concurring) (asserting that had Dolan not decided this issue, he 
would have agreed with the dissent that the property owner had lost nothing and could not state a takings 
claim). They base their claim on Justice Stevens’s statement in his Dolan dissent that “no taking has yet 
occurred,” as the owner had not yet begun the expanded use of her property and therefore had not yet 
been required to deed an easement to the government. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). But the Dolan majority’s recitation of the facts clearly states that the government had 
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property owners challenged a condition attached to a building permit issued 
by the California Coastal Commission requiring them to grant an easement 
allowing the public to walk across their property.94 In both cases, the 
property owners challenged the exactions attached to their applications to 
build. These conditions required the dedication of public easements and 
therefore forced the property owners to forfeit their right to exclude the 
public from their land and suffer a permanent occupation of their property. 
These conditions clearly would have required compensation under the 
Loretto test if imposed unilaterally and outside of the narrow context of 
exactions.95 
 If Nollan and Dolan present the archetypal sets of facts that trigger 
intermediate scrutiny, then we can draw two inferences about the type of 
conditions that constitute “exactions” in a federal constitutional sense. First, 
the condition must include a “taking” of property for which compensation 
would be due if the government imposed the requirement unilaterally—this 
must be true no matter how limited or broad the universe of conditions to 
which the two decisions apply. Second, Nollan and Dolan can only apply 
when the government agency officially requires the challenged condition in 
a completed regulatory process. The property owners in both cases knew 
precisely what was required of them by the final conditions attached to the 
approvals they received at the end of the application process. These 
triggering facts work together to form the basis for administrative and 
judicial review, allowing both processes to identify the taken property 
interests to which the nexus and rough proportionality tests apply. 
 Failed exactions, in which agencies have issued no conditional 
approval, differ from Nollan and Dolan. This distinction is both formal and 
procedural. On first glance, the formal distinction appears insignificant. In 
Justice Scalia’s terms, there is little functional difference between a 
condition precedent and a condition subsequent—in each, the government 
is conditioning issuance of an entitlement on an otherwise unconstitutional 
condition.96 But the difference between the failed exaction (in which the 
                                                                                                             
“granted petitioner’s permit application subject to conditions imposed by the city’s [Community 
Development Code].” Id. at 379; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 439 (Or. 1993) (stating 
that the government “granted petitioner’s application, but required as conditions [the dedication of 
various easements]”).  
 94. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987). 
 95. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385–86 (characterizing exactions as “a requirement that [the owner] 
deed portions of the property to the city,” for which she would otherwise be due just compensation); 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their 
beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the 
beach, . . . we have no doubt there would have been a taking.”). 
 96. Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000). 
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government never finalizes the condition as required for an entitlement that 
it can deny) and the completed one (in which the government has identified 
and specified the conditions it will require) is crucial for constitutional 
purposes. Only when the agency has specified the exaction can a court 
know what property has or will be taken. Insofar as the Fifth Amendment’s 
text requires property to be taken as a basis for just compensation (a point I 
will develop further below), Nollan and Dolan require the identification and 
finalization of a condition as a predicate to an exactions claim. 
 This seemingly insignificant but constitutionally meaningful formal 
requirement, which the Koontz majority recognized in refusing to expand 
Nollan and Dolan,97 also has a procedural purpose. A property owner surely 
could not use failed negotiations or discussions over an exaction as a means 
to avoid the ripeness and administrative exhaustion requirements necessary 
for a takings claim.98 This procedural point, which is related to the formal, 
substantive one, persuaded the concurrence in Koontz that it could not reach 
the property owner’s constitutional challenge to a failed exaction.99 
Exhaustion and ripeness requirements help preserve judicial resources and 
give agencies the opportunity to build a record that can demonstrate 
compliance with Nollan and Dolan. An agency might defer its nexus and 
proportionality study until it has finalized its proposed mitigation. 
Following Nollan and Dolan, agencies know to prepare such findings when 
they officially issue a conditional permit. Forcing them to meet such 
requirements before permit issuance will either raise administrative costs or 
make negotiations and discussions over mitigation appear less attractive to 
agencies. These consequences are considered in more detail below. For 
now, note that the procedural distinction between failed and completed 
exactions is in fact quite significant. Moreover, this distinction illustrates 
why the Court would and should limit Nollan and Dolan’s intermediate 
scrutiny to final conditions, even if the dedications have not yet occurred. 
B. Finalized Exactions and the Fifth Amendment Text 
 The Fifth Amendment states that “private property [shall not] be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”100 Failed exactions do not 
culminate in “private property” being “taken for public use.” Unlike in 
Nollan and Dolan, the state has not identified property to be taken in 
                                                                                                             
 97. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 19 (Fla., Nov. 3, 2011). 
 98. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985); 
see also infra Part IV.D. 
 99. Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 22 (Polston, J., concurring). 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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exchange for a permit approval. Instead, the property owners’ application 
has been denied. Even when an agency’s actions are unreasonable and 
result in extortionate demands or bad faith, no property has been taken. As a 
constitutional matter, the claim sounds in due process, not in the Takings 
Clause. 
 Because no property was taken, no “just compensation” can be 
awarded. It is well-established that the Takings Clause “is designed not to 
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to 
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking.”101 When a court considers whether the government 
has taken property, it must identify the property interest actually taken from 
the owner that the government will receive in exchange for its payment of 
just compensation. In an exactions case, if a court determines that the 
Nollan and Dolan tests have not been met, the exacted property is deemed 
taken and the government must pay compensation for the property interest 
exacted.102 However, when the government first considers approving a 
conditional permit with an exaction but decides instead to deny the permit 
application without imposing a condition, there is no identifiable property 
interest for which the government could logically be required to pay 
compensation.  
 The logic and purpose behind the Nollan and Dolan tests command this 
conclusion. Nollan and Dolan rest on the premise that the government 
always has the option to restrict the use of property in order to protect the 
health and safety of the public rather than attempt to mitigate the effects of 
proposed development through an exaction. When the government chooses 
to deny a permit, courts apply the traditional, deferential regulatory takings 
doctrine; when the government chooses to approve with conditions, courts 
apply intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the heightened, but not per se or strict, 
takings standard of Nollan and Dolan reflects not only the fact that an 
exaction is more intrusive than mere regulation of property use, but also 
that the government could have rejected the development application rather 
than approving it with exactions. Nollan and Dolan presume that the 
government always has the option under its police power authority to reject 
the development application rather than approving it with an exaction 
attached. It logically follows that when the government has in fact decided 
                                                                                                             
 101. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 315 (1987). 
 102. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 841–43 (1987) (holding that if 
government “wants an easement,” and the forced dedication is deemed to be unconstitutional, 
government “must pay for it”). 
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to act in a traditional regulatory mode in lieu of imposing an exaction, 
traditional regulatory takings analysis must apply. 
 Indeed, the logic of the Court’s entire categorical approach to the 
Takings Clause requires that the government has in fact taken property for 
Nollan and Dolan to apply. Lingle explained that a regulatory taking must 
be “functionally equivalent” to confiscation.103 In Lucas, the Court held that 
the “total” taking of the use and value of the property was “the equivalent 
of a physical appropriation.”104 Similarly, a permanent physical invasion 
“eviscerates the owner’s right to exclude others . . . [which is] perhaps the 
most fundamental of all property interests.”105 And in Nollan and Dolan, the 
appropriation of an easement as part of the issuance of a development 
permit “would have been a per se physical taking” if the government had 
simply confiscated it.106 Lingle made clear that the fundamental predicate 
required for the Takings Clause to apply is a government act that 
confiscates or approximates the confiscation of privately owned land. 
Offers, negotiations, or even threats to take land do not create a 
constitutionally mandated compensation requirement. As Judge Griffin 
stated in her dissent in Koontz III, “[i]t is not the making of an offer to 
which unconditional conditions are attached in violation of the limitations 
of Nollan/Dolan that gives rise to a taking; it is the receipt of some tangible 
benefit under such coercive circumstances that gives rise to the taking.”107 
 In addition to specifying that the taking of property is a constitutionally 
permitted wrong, the Fifth Amendment also specifically identifies “just 
compensation” as the only remedy available to the property owner. This 
limitation is obvious in the eminent domain context when the state 
condemns or confiscates property, forcing the owner to transfer ownership 
of the property. The transfer of that property then becomes the basis for 
compensation. Under Lingle’s “functional equivalence” logic, the Fifth 
Amendment’s remedy must be identical for a regulatory taking. 
Furthermore, Lingle’s rejection of due process logic within regulatory 
takings tests also requires courts to refuse to award the archetypal due 
process remedies of an invalidation of the challenged state action and an 
                                                                                                             
 103. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). 
 104. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992). 
 105. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. 
 106. Id. at 546. 
 107. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d 8, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (citing Lingle, 
544 U.S. at 539–40); see also Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 8 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011) (“[I]n what 
parallel legal universe or deep chamber of Wonderland’s rabbit hole could there be a right to just 
compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth Amendment when no property of any kind was 
ever taken by the government and none ever given up by the owner?” (quoting Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 20 
(Griffin, J., dissenting))). 
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injunction against future similar action.108 Put simply, compensation is the 
only remedy available for a prevailing plaintiff in a regulatory takings 
action. 
 Existing cases demonstrate that failed exactions require a remedy other 
than compensation. The Eighth Circuit recognized this in Goss II and 
awarded neither compensation nor invalidation. The court in Jones 
Insurance Trust and the intermediate appellate court in Koontz III provided 
inappropriate remedies. Each invalidated a valid exercise of regulatory 
authority, while the overturned decision in Koontz III also compensated the 
owner for the temporary taking of his property during the period when his 
permit application had been denied. This occurred even though the decision 
to reject the application was authorized by state law, and the court did not 
evaluate whether during that period the owner had lost all economically 
beneficial use of the property. Neither court could apply the appropriate, 
and only, remedy available under the Just Compensation Clause to a 
prevailing plaintiff in a regulatory takings case—clear evidence of the 
inappropriate nature of such a claim under the Fifth Amendment. 
C. Failed Exactions and the Negotiation Process 
 The land use process has come to depend increasingly on regulatory 
tools that allow for flexibility and bargaining between government entities 
and property owners.109 Local land use regulation has accordingly stood in 
the vanguard of regulatory flexibility and negotiation, a trend that has 
gained some purchase at the federal level.110 Flexibility in the local land use 
process can serve as a means to resolve disputes along two axes: first, by 
enabling regulator and regulated to find mutually agreeable terms; and 
                                                                                                             
 108. But see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2607 (2010) (plurality opinion) (stating, in dictum, that there is “no reason why [compensation] would 
be the exclusive remedy for a judicial taking”). In a few outlying modern regulatory takings decisions, 
issued before Lingle’s clear statement that compensation is the only remedy available under the Just 
Compensation Clause, the Court has granted non-compensatory relief to prevailing plaintiffs. See, e.g., 
E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 521 (1998) (plurality opinion) (affirming injunctive relief granted by 
the U.S. district court for a regulatory takings claim in a monetary takings case, as opposed to the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims acting under Tucker Act jurisdiction, for suggesting that requiring 
compensation for a taking of money would be “an utterly pointless set of activities” (quoting Student 
Loan Mktg. Ass’n v. Riley, 104 F.3d 397, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1997))); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–18 
(1987) (invalidating a federal statute on the ground that it effected a taking of private property without 
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment). 
 109. See generally STEWART E. STERK & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, LAND USE REGULATION 
31–51 (2011). 
 110. See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570 (1994 & Supp. 2000). See 
generally JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 
653–57 (2009) (summarizing literature on negotiated rulemaking in federal administrative processes). 
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second, by enabling a more responsive local regulatory process that not 
only can lead to more participatory and popular results but also can alleviate 
local voter antipathy towards new development and anxiety about its effects 
on home values.111 The threat that failed negotiations can serve as the basis 
for a Nollan and Dolan challenge to an agency’s preliminary and informal 
offers will have significant effects on the bargaining process. As Judge 
Griffin noted in her dissent in Koontz III, applying Nollan and Dolan to 
failed exactions will make negotiations “too risky for a governmental 
agency to make offers for conditional permit approvals or to offer a trade of 
benefits out of fear that the offer might be rejected and the condition later 
found to have lacked adequate nexus or proportionality.”112 
 In this regard, property owners might ultimately be harmed. Wary 
government agencies might simply deny permits and face lower scrutiny 
under the Penn Central test rather than discuss mitigation measures as 
conditions for approval and face heightened scrutiny under Nollan and 
Dolan.113 By inhibiting a government agency’s willingness to bargain 
without inhibiting its authority to deny a property owner’s application to 
develop, applying Nollan and Dolan to failed exactions would eliminate a 
valuable right from property owners—or at least an important opportunity 
to reach a preferred end114––while simultaneously removing a key 
regulatory tool and process for government agencies. This represents the 
worst possible result: government agencies cannot negotiate adequate, 
workable mitigation measures with property owners; property owners are 
more likely to be denied discretionary approvals from wary government 
agencies; and the entire regulatory process becomes more rigid and 
mechanical, resulting in a larger proportion of denials and fewer negotiated 
solutions to pressing environmental and planning conflicts.115 
D. Failed Exactions and the Administrative Review Process 
 Property owners can also use any discussions or negotiations as a 
springboard for avoiding administrative appeals to permit denials. They 
                                                                                                             
 111. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 230–32 (2001); Fenster, Takings 
Formalism, supra note 10, at 668–78. 
 112. Koontz III, 5 So. 3d at 21 (Griffin, J., dissenting). 
 113. Cf. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 348–
49 (1995) (characterizing Nollan and Dolan as decisions which appear to offer property owners formal 
protections while harming their ability to bargain to their preferred result).  
 114. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA 
L. REV. 1, 50 (2000). 
 115. Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 10, at 652–67 (noting the variable but generally 
worse consequences of imposing formal rules on negotiation processes). 
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thereby bypass the long-settled means for local governments to review and 
reconsider decisions and to build a thorough administrative record for 
judicial review. These procedural hurdles stand especially tall in delaying 
litigants’ entrance to federal court under the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision 
in Williamson County, which requires a claimant to “seek compensation 
through the procedures the State has provided for doing so” in order to 
ripen a federal constitutional takings claim.116 Under Williamson County, 
claimants must raise all of their state claims in state court before their 
federal takings claims are ripe for adjudication in federal court.117 As the 
Court explained a year after Williamson County, “an essential prerequisite” 
to a regulatory takings claim “is a final and authoritative determination of 
the type and intensity of development legally permitted on the subject 
property.”118 Williamson County made clear that without such a 
determination, “it is impossible to tell whether the land retained any 
reasonable beneficial use or whether respondent’s expectation interests had 
been destroyed.”119 
 States tend to follow this general logic in establishing their own 
ripeness doctrines.120 This applies equally in takings challenges to 
exactions, where the Oregon Supreme Court has recently explained: 
 
[A] requirement that a property owner take administrative steps 
prior to bringing judicial action permits the local government to 
determine the necessary effects of the regulations and whether, 
knowing those effects, it wishes to impose or enforce them. Just 
as a court benefits by requiring that local governments have the 
opportunity to assess fully the effects that use limitations have on 
property owners, so too does a court benefit from requiring that 
                                                                                                             
 116. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). 
 117. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 337 (2005) (assuming 
Williamson County requires a “final state judgment” before a federal takings claim becomes ripe in 
federal court); id. at 348–49 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (agreeing that Willamson County requires a 
claimant to seek compensation in state court before bringing a federal takings claim in federal court but 
questioning whether the decision was correct). 
 118. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). For a general 
discussion of ripeness and regulatory takings in federal courts, see Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory 
Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 119. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 189 n.11. 
 120. See, e.g., Milagra Ridge Partners, Ltd. v. City of Pacifica, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 394, 399–400 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that California has adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to the 
ripeness doctrine); Casey v. Mayor of Rockville, 929 A.2d 74, 103–04 (Md. 2007) (explaining 
Maryland’s ripeness doctrine with reference to U.S. Supreme Court precedents and explicitly adopting 
Williamson County’s approach to ripeness for regulatory takings claims in state court); Hill-Grant 
Living Trust v. Kearsarge Lighting Precinct, 986 A.2d 662, 669 (N.H. 2009); Mayhew v. Town of 
Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1998) (explaining the ripeness doctrine in the regulatory takings 
context with reference to U.S. Supreme Court precedent). 
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local governments have the opportunity to consider fully whether 
the conditions on development that it seeks to require are 
proportional to the impacts of development and whether to insist 
on imposing those conditions, given the assessment that it 
makes.121 
 
As the concurrence in Koontz IV noted regarding Florida law, owners must 
use the required administrative review procedures to challenge the propriety 
of a permit denial, and then file their legal challenge in the district court of 
appeal or the trial court sitting in its appellate capacity over administrative 
adjudications.122 Government agencies are thereby able to reconsider their 
regulatory decisions through an orderly administrative process that will 
produce a record that can in turn enable efficient and accurate judicial 
review. Allowing property owners to avoid these longstanding, orderly 
administrative and judicial procedures to challenge a permit denial can 
encourage property owners to seek judicial review of unripe claims with 
complex factual disputes that require extensive development at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
 Failed exactions claims are non-cognizable under the Supreme Court’s 
Nollan and Dolan tests, and the non-existent conditions that would form the 
basis of such claims cannot constitute property under the plain text of the 
Takings Clause. In some circumstances, a property owner might have 
viable claims under the U.S. Constitution or other authorities to challenge 
the government’s regulatory acts. The permit denial that follows from failed 
negotiations can serve as the basis of a takings claim under the default Penn 
Central test, albeit one with little chance of winning.123 Especially unfair 
treatment by the regulatory agency could serve as the basis for a substantive 
due process claim under the U.S. Constitution—again, one that might exist 
more in theory than in practice.124 But federal law is not the only protection 
                                                                                                             
 121. W. Linn Corporate Park, L.L.C. v. City of W. Linn, 240 P.3d 29, 38 (Or. 2010); see also id. 
at 39 (holding that “Oregon law requires the landowner to pursue available local administrative 
remedies . . . as a prerequisite to bringing that action in state court”). 
 122. See Koontz IV, No. SC09-713, slip op. at 22 (Fla. Nov. 3, 2011) (Polston, J., concurring) 
(citing FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2002)); Key Haven Associated Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the 
Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d 153, 159 (Fla. 1982)). 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29 (describing Penn Central and its role in 
regulatory takings jurisprudence); see also Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory 
Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 544–76 (2009) (describing how Penn Central’s balancing test 
works after Lingle). 
 124. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 
2614–15 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) 
(“[T]he Due Process Clause is intended, in part, to protect the individual against ‘the exercise of power 
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to which property owners can turn. State courts can provide some relief to 
the extent that state constitutional law provides greater due process and 
property rights protection than federal constitutional law.125 More 
promisingly, state and local governments can and do impose legal 
limitations on the use of exactions.126 Further, political norms and the threat 
of political accountability can stop or soften regulatory hard-bargaining, 
especially when it unfairly overreaches.127 
 None of these solutions will provide absolute protection for a property 
owner who has been exploited by a state or local entity acting in bad faith. 
While it is unclear how frequently such bad-faith dealings occur, it is quite 
clear that property owners should have no recourse to the heightened 
scrutiny that Nollan and Dolan provide. 
                                                                                                             
without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.’” (quoting 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998))). But see Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2606 
(plurality opinion) (denying the applicability of substantive due process to the regulation of property); J. 
Peter Byrne, Due Process Claims After Lingle, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 471, 472 (2007) (characterizing the 
likelihood of a property owner’s victory with a federal substantive due process claim as “virtually 
never”). 
 125. With respect to states’ substantive due process doctrines, see Byrne, supra note 124, at 
480–91 (describing state courts’ roles in policing unfair land use regulation, and in developing more 
locally sensitive standards of review under state substantive due process doctrines). On state courts’ 
applications of distinct regulatory takings doctrines, see Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L. J. 203, 261–70 (2004). Indeed, Florida itself has long 
adopted its own standards for the review of impact fees, although that test would not, after Koontz IV, be 
applicable to failed exactions. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 609–10 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (developing a due process-based dual-rational-nexus test that considers whether 
there was a reasonable connection between (1) the locality’s need for additional capital facilities and the 
new development and (2) the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the new development). 
 126. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow, supra note 3, at 758–68. 
 127. Id.  
